by Christian revelation to the categories used for analyzing human
and political relationships.

Y

This article deals with an aspect of the contemporary political crisis
in Western countries, namely, the sharpening conflict between politics and truth, a problem interwoven with the progressive loss of authoritativeness in contemporary politics. The risk of reducing truth to
opinion is to be expected in a merely procedural interpretation of democracy, obscuring the element of shared truth that lies at the origin of
every political community. The expansion of power to the detriment of
authority contributes ultimately to forgetting the original truth, that
should instead be refocused and brought up-to-date in order to give a
sense of direction once again to communal life. A notable aid for proceeding in that direction is the dialectic method, with which the search
for truth in Western civilization began, on the basis of which the truth
is always a communitarian quest. Such a communitarian vision assumes particular importance in light of the renewed insights brought

ou have touched a tender nerve in many people, puncturing their existential lie, and they hate you for it. . . . Truth
gets beaten to death, as Kierkegaard said of Socrates and
of Jesus.”1 This passage from a famous letter of Karl Jaspers written to Hannah Arendt in the middle of the twentieth century addresses the difficult relationship between truth and politics once
again in connection with the Holocaust. It is always a tormented
relationship. The issue of truth, indeed, is not restricted to the individual conscience, but by its very nature tends to become a matter of public relevance, posing the question not only of what in a
determined situation or historical period is the truth for an individual, but also what truth is for the community.
Traditionally, truth was always the professional object of philosophers in the profound sense of a profession of faith or a life
choice. Indeed, Socrates lived out the conflict between truth and
politics to its ultimate outcome. He was condemned by the state,
which did offer him the possibility of avoiding death by accepting exile. That was an exquisitely political solution, a compromise
by the majority who affirmed his guilt that provided a way out to
avoid the accusation of cruelty. Either way, they would be free of
Socrates. But this was a solution Socrates could not accept since
where the choice is between truth and falsehood, compromise is
not possible because the truth does not allow for bargaining.2 By
accepting death, Socrates exposed the false judgment entailed in
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1. Karl Jaspers, “Letter of July 25, 1963,” in E. Young-Bruehl, Hanna Arendt: For Love
of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 402.
2. This is a principal message in The Apology of Socrates.
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the offer for what it was, and let everyone see how real the lie was
that condemned him.
Socrates represents the conflict between truth and politics in
which opinion plays the lead role. Whether opinion is true or false,
it belongs to a different order from truth because it is not a certain
knowledge. Many people professed opinions over Socrates’ trial,
which was effectively conducted by the civil authority in order to
channel the proceedings in the desired direction and to determine
the sentence. From a philosophical standpoint, sycophants and
sophists brought into the trial elements foreign to the truth but
useful as instruments of the political power. Their artistry, while
similar to the dialectic used by philosophers following Socrates in
seeking the truth, is distinguished from the latter precisely because
it does not have the truth as its goal and orientation. The sophists,
Plato observed, do not use dialectic, but eristike,3 a form of struggle
in which adversaries brandish opinions that are often only a camouflage for their real interests. Dialectic as the art of searching for
truth is replaced by rhetoric, the art of persuasion.4 The critique of
ideology, as we see here, originated well before Karl Marx.
Socrates’ case is not an isolated one. His successor, Plato, already
recognized the danger of espousing the truth before those who are
accustomed to opinion. Now that he had freed himself from imprisonment at the back of the cave, would he dare explain to the
other prisoners that there was another world, a real one of which
most people were unaware? 5 Yet Plato accepted the risk and created the most famous school of all time, the Academy, a true and
open forum within, and often contrary to, the city administration.
3. Plato, Sophist, 226a.
4. Plato, Gorgias, VII, 451d–452e.
5. Plato, The Republic, VII, 514a–517a.
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The conflict between truth and politics has remained alive
throughout history. Even when the philosopher sided with the state
and against the truth, he or she remained aware of how distinct the
two were: “Disobedience,” writes Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan,
“can legitimately be punished in those who teach a philosophy
contrary to the law, even if it is true.”6 The state would be able then
to embrace a lie officially if it is useful for achieving its ends. Even
Plato agreed that officials could lie for the good of their subjects,
emphasizing that what is inadmissable in philosophy can be effective in politics. Hobbes’s point is that the state is the one thing
truly necessary for maintaining order and guaranteeing security
in the life of its citizens. For Hobbes, politics is a function of life
regardless of how it may be conducted, whereas for Socrates, a life
deprived of truth is not worth living. From Hobbes’s point of view,
truth and politics are clearly separate, and politics is interested in
truth only when it becomes a problem of public order. Therefore,
the lie in politics is often justified as the lesser evil. People are
lied to “for their own good,” and to avoid recourse to more violent
means of persuasion. On that basis, truth and politics belong to
two different orders that never communicate. This raises the question: Is there any point where truth and politics can meet? If so,
what might it be?
Authority and the Separation of Truth from Politics
The separation of truth from politics is common currency today.
It has become a key issue in a skewed vision of democracy that
knowingly renounces the truth in favor of opinion. Procedurally, the exercise of polical power is not based on truth but on
6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, XLVI.
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the opinion of the citizens. In reaching decisions at the national,
regional, and local levels, the question is not whether the opinions
of the citizens are true; just tally them. From this perspective, the
logic of political decision making excludes concern for the truth so
that conflicts can be resolved in a nonviolent fashion. If the various
parties came to blows, each in the name of the truth that allows
no compromise, there would be total deadlock and no possibility
of resolution. This is the justification for making decisions on the
basis of majority rule. That being the case, there is no guarantee
that the resulting decisions will be true, only that they were made
without recourse to violence or war.
There is some element of wisdom in this position: it does not
wish to claim as true that which was decided by a short-term majority. This avoids admitting the existence of a unique truth that
tends to impose itself and that would rule out the freedom of each
individual to adhere personally to a freely sought and chosen truth.
These are issues of prudence that contemporary democracies have
verified in the struggle against totalitarianism that did not take
account of those principles in the twentieth century. But there is
a weakness to this approach: accepting such limitations to human
reason leads to a distrust of its ability to reach certainty. This distrust of reason proclaims a distrust of human nature, a distrust of
its relational dimension because it makes truth a matter of only
personal choice, thus limiting it to that which is true for the individual in a private domain where truth is “relative” and has no value
on a universal level. In this way, it induces a subtle mystification:
this weakness of reason is presented as something positive because
it would allow free debate for individuals to determine communal
certainties that would not have to be acknowledged as objective
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truths. Truth is now the fruit of agreement; it is a conjectural truth
established by convention.
This is very different from the truth Plato is speaking about,
namely, a dialectic search that philosophers carried out together
leading to a recognition of the truth that was not considered as
hypothetical. Searching together did not express the need for the
potential antagonists to agree, but was seen simply as the only way
to find the truth. They could point out one another’s errors and so
make progress because the very nature of truth is manifested in a
community, and only then to the individual after the community
has made her or him capable of receiving it.7 Perhaps we can learn
today from this philosophical attitude of Plato, which holds both
to the existence of objective truth and to the free personal and
communal search for it. Today, these two things are considered
contradictory, with the result that various political theories opt for
one or the other. But it is only by holding on to both of them together that an adequate foundation for the democratic ideal can be
established. This is the core of the problem.
A correct understanding of democracy recognizes not only the
power of the majority of the moment, but also an authority that
we could call “foundational authority.” This is the totality of the
universally accepted principles on which the political society is
based and which are generally expressed in the state Constitution
or other documents of similar importance. A state takes shape in
extraordinary moments through very real historical trials for that
population: an ethnic migration, a war of liberation or a civil war,
citizens seeking refuge from oppressive regimes, the conquest of
7. Plato, Seventh Letter, 341c–d.
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new territories, the breakup of an empire, or the establishment of
a federation, etc. These are opportunities when the people, forged
by some historic testing, draw out of culture, religion, tradition,
and life experiences the guidelines for the establishment of a new
state. These opportunities provide illumination and intuition in
which events, debates and ideas erect the supporting pillars for the
constitution that will continue for years to come. Its principles are
kept alive by the many cultural traditions that contribute to the
foundation of the political society. In this process, all the subsequent laws voted on by a particular majority should be confronted
with the founding values, and, if there is conflict, they should be
modified. The values of the foundational authority were, in fact, acknowledged as true. They can be reread, reinterpreted, and brought
up-to-date, but not suppressed unless there is a conscious desire to
change the nature of that society itself.
This foundational authority, distinct from the power of the
majority—or the monarch or government—was often recognized
and accepted for millennia. In the distant past, it was said to be
the “will of the gods” to which the ruler himself had to submit.
More recently in the West, through the influence of Christianity,
there was recognition of an antecedent “natural law” that could
not be contravened by the laws of the state.8 With the arrival of
democratic states, constitutions often blended together religious
inspiration, recognition of natural law, and the principles and experiences that led to the foundation of the state. In these cases,
politics is not contrasted to the truth. Rather, in the course of history, especially during the decisive moments when a new political
body is born, politics recognizes its own need for the truth as well
8. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q.91, a.3.
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as the fact that it cannot decide the truth itself. It can only adapt to
it because truth belongs to an authority prior to and greater than
politics itself.
The concern today is the increasing tendency—both in theory
and in daily political practice—to deny this type of authority and
leave everything up to the will of the majority, even if it means
bypassing or impudently modifying the constitutional principles.
In that way, it seems that politics leaves it to individual citizens to
decide for themselves their “own” truth. In many democratic countries, laws are made that leave—apparently—the important decisions to the individual (for instance, abortion, euthanasia, wages
insufficent to secure the minimum to live), forgetting that in many
cases an indispensable value is at stake. In doing this, the political power takes a step ahead toward privatizing and relativizing
the truth. Truth is no longer seen as a common patrimony, but
it is equated with private opinion and then established by majority rule. We are no longer at the mere procedural exclusion of
the truth in favor of opinion, an exclusion that, as we have seen,
contains some elements of wisdom. We are now actually giving
opinions the value of truth. This is how political power cancels all
limitations to its own exercise and “takes possession” of the truth.
But a truth that is owned by someone is meaningless and can be
brandished about like a club, modified, adapted, and twisted at
pleasure. This explains much of the so-called normal behavior of
the political class today. With the swirl of declarations, denials,
change of positions, and the forming and then the dissolving of
alliances, and given the indifference of too many citizens, many
politicians seem to have lost all sense of their calling. They are
continually changing their “plan of action,” giving the impression
that they have lost their way. When parties have lost their way, the
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community at large loses its way. With the abandonment of truth
in politics goes also the loss of real authoritativeness.
Real authority is, in fact, quite different. It means preserving a
plan, conserving the principles and values that established the life
of the community or group, and hence maintaining a clear aim
and direction. Authority calls forth the original basis and source
of community life. As a parent retains authority even when he or
she no longer has power over the children, the founders of a state
retain authority even when they no longer govern. Parents are not
simply loved, but are honored, and rendering honor is expressed
through fidelity, which is a steadfast attitude that does not expire
and require renewal. This is also the case with the real authority
of the state. The state’s power is only an instrument for bringing
about and making explicit in the daily life of the citizens those
principles that the authority is charged always to preserve. Power
must be “authoritative,” that is, it must always act in accord with
the overall design that the authority preserves. If this should be
disregarded, then power is left with mere empty procedures and
becomes irrelevant or introduces—out of either triviality or the
triumph of one particular ideology or the pressure of private interests—measures that contradict its foundational values. Then, for
example, in a political community that was instituted to affirm
equality and freedom and to defend life, daily decisions can be
made that are actually inimical to equality, freedom, and life. In the
worst case scenario, power without boundaries and without the
direction established by foundational authority becomes an oppressive power, a real terror. In any case, what characterizes power
detached from authority is infidelity. This explains one aspect of
today’s crisis of political authority: the difficulty of believing in
someone who is not faithful.
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Authority and the Limitations of Power:
From the Tree to the Cross
The distinction between authority and power is not just an issue
for us today. On the contrary, it has been a starting point for civilization right from the beginning of history. The book of Genesis is
not just a holy text, but also a document bearing on of the beginnings of civilization. Indeed, it gives us early categories for interpreting communal life. It is an original reflection on the human
condition which—along with other converging currents—influenced the development of Western history and remains operative
even today.
The distinction between authority and power is a central issue
from the very outset of Genesis, especially as regards the divine
origin of authority and the limits of human power. The human
person is created by God and receives from God a “mandate of
dominion” that qualifies human nature.9 Romano Guardini writes:
“The human being’s natural likeness to God consists in this gift of
power, in the capacity to make use of it and in the governance that
flows from it.”10 Guardini is speaking of the “ontological” character of power: “One cannot be human and then over and above
that exercise some power; rather, exercising that power is part of
what one is.”11 In symbolic language, the first chapters of Genesis
present a picture containing, at least in germinal form, a number
of important elements from which a doctrine of the limitation of
power can be developed.
9. Genesis 1:28.
10. Romano Guardini, Die Macht: Versuch einer wegweisung (Würzburg: WerkbundVerlag, 1957), p. 31.
11. Ibid.
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Power is limited first of all because of its origin. The mandate
to dominion is in fact received from God; therefore, it is a power
that must conform to the authority of the Creator and always be
answerable to the Creator. This is the essence of the limitation of
power. It lies in the fact that it is not self-creating, but receives its
being given its origin outside those who exercise it. This limitation is represented by the prohibition against eating the fruit of
the tree in the middle of the garden. The tree marks a boundary,
but also constitutes the axis of the human world in establishing a
center around which human power is exercised and given direction. Therefore in this sense, the limitation is not seen as a denigration of those people on whom it is imposed, but, like a definition,
it confers an identity, it brings a fulfillment. The error of Adam
and Eve consists precisely, according to the ancient story, in violating the prohibition. That is, they denied any boundary that might
mark a distinction between divine authority, which has a creative
and absolute power, and human power, which cannot create but
only can bring creation to further perfection. Adam and Eve want
to be gods who are self-sufficient and can shape the plan of God to
their own ends. But this would obscure its very design and weaken
their ability to fulfill the mandate of dominion.
Second, besides being limited by the existence of the authority
that establishes it, human power is limited because it presupposes
the object on which it is exercised, that is, on humankind and creation.
Power is limited because humankind is not the creator; persons
can only co-create, carry to fulfillment, and make perfect, but they
cannot remake. The highly symbolic episode in which Adam confers a name on the animals explains the nature of human power:
the human being only acknowledges the animals’ nature.12 Their
12. Genesis 2:19–20.
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nature is revealed by Adam; he does not invent it. On the contrary,
in eating the forbidden fruit Adam and Eve want to be their own
masters as absolute masters of everything. Their action will provoke nature to rebellion, and it will refuse complete submission.
The earth will not be totally humanized; rather, human beings will
die and become earth.13 Positively speaking, this awareness that
power is exercised on an already given is present also in some of
the most significant modern concepts of the origin of the state.
Both John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with their different
perspectives, presuppose the existence of a natural law antecedent
to the contract that generates the political society, which has the
task of safeguarding and expressing that law.
Third, power is limited in its mode of exercise. Indeed, our being
in the “image and likeness” of God—which is manifested first of
all, as Guardini emphasized, in the bestowal of the mandate—
finds its full expression, as the creation story of the priestly tradition emphasizes, in the unity and distinction that constitute
human beings: “God created man in his image; in the divine
image he created him, male and female he created them.”14 The
relationship between male and female, as Genesis describes it, reflects
human reality as “image” of God. This says something to us about
God because God is not described directly but through the relationship between male and female. This relationship expresses
the logic of the relationships in the Garden of Eden, and explains
also the way in which the two enter into relationship with creation. That is, it defines how their dominion will be exercised. This
relationship received from God is a harmonious relationship of
full transparency and mutual giving. The ordering that will come
13. Genesis 3:19.
14. Genesis 1:27.
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about through dominion will have to reflect the existing order between male and female, and between them and God. It is an ethic
of love that applies to dominion in general, to every exercise of
power, and therefore also to political power. Such an ethic—in the
biblical perspective—is the essential norm for exercising power
from which all other norms rise. Also, power is not absolute in
that it is regulated. The fundamental rule, the rule of rules, is love.
Disobedience of the divine authority entails the loss of loving relationships. Man and woman, from a condition of harmony and
equality, fall into one of conflict and subordination, represented by
the submission of the woman to the man. This explains symbolically, and at the same time ontologically, the perennial possibility
that the use of power will become domination of persons over
persons.
In short, according to this interpretation of Genesis, power must
show a threefold fidelity: to the authority that grants it, to the nature of the object on which it is exercised, and to the love ethic that
regulates relationships between creatures. And right at this key
point we come upon the other great foundational event of Western civilization: the opening up to Christianity. From a Christian
point of view, the forbidden tree extends down through the centuries, right up to the gibbet of the Cross from which Jesus cries:
“My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” This cry expresses
the ultimate powerlessness of Jesus and the failure of every human
project that arose around him. Nevertheless, the cry—as Chiara
Lubich emphasizes—is an action of ultimate fidelity because Jesus,
precisely in asking God the reason for his abandonment, encourages us to continue believing that God’s power is not an empty
one leading to aimless annihilation, but is an Authority that holds
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in itself a design in which even the abandonment finds meaning.15 Jesus’ cry asks for the purpose, which he does not see, but
whose existence, safeguarded by the Other, Jesus does not doubt.
Jesus’ question is an expression of complete fidelity, of a purer faith,
which leads him beyond his own capacities to accept fully in himself the judgment on human power absolutized by Adam, which is
then restored by Jesus’ cry to the divine Authority.
In fact, the cry of abandonment shows that Jesus’ self-emptying
goes so far as to endure the complete power of evil unleashed and
exhausted on him. His cry restores to divine Omnipotence all the
forces of creation that evil had taken over for itself. With evil contained in Jesus forsaken, God expresses all his Sovereign Power in
terms of Love, giving himself back to Jesus in the resurrection.16
According to Guardini, “Jesus treats human power as it is, as a
reality.”17 I would say more: Jesus renders it real by enduring it, since
the entire human order becomes a new reality in the Incarnation,
the final act of which—before the Resurrection—is the cry. Jesus
confers final reality on evil and delivers it over to God. Human beings now face a choice: espouse the power that has crucified Jesus
and remain in an order that rejects the original authority, or accept
the annihilation of that power by being crucified with Jesus, and
receive, in the Risen Lord, the universal sovereignty over creation
that Adam had lost.
15. Chiara Lubich, The Cry of Jesus Crucified and Forsaken (New York: New City Press,
2001), pp. 24–34.
16. Concerning this notion of Sovereignty, see Antonio Maria Baggio, “Trinità e politica: Riflessione su alcune categorie politiche alla luce della rivelazione trinitaria,”
Nuova Umanità 19 (1997): 727–97.
17. Guardini, Die Macht, p. 46.
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This second choice leads to a full restoration of the “mandate of
dominion,” which is expressed in the recovery of the original loving relationship among people, energized by the fullness of meaning received from Christ. Jesus himself still reveals the new order
to us through his cry. His kenosis, in fact, is total abasement; he is
mingled with the earth. The Hebrew Scripture already called him
the “worm of the earth,” the completely humble one. By uniting
with humanity and with the earth, he submits to worldly power,
which permits him to become “earth”—humus, nourishment—in
which the Other plants its roots. Crying the Other from the bowels of the earth, Jesus expresses the soul of creation. Encompassed
in him, creation cries out to its own origin: God. The annihilation of Jesus defeats human power as absolute power because in
the moment in which he submits to it, by crying the Other, he
expresses his obedience. With this, he reveals his being as Person,
he reveals the essential relationship of the person that says God, the
nothing that says Everything.
Personal and Impersonal Power:
The Question of Responsibility
The tree and the Cross introduce a “personalistic” conception of
power. In exploring this aspect, we can begin with Romano Guardini’s definition of power as the ability to put reality into motion.18
It consists of two elements: force, which is pure capability without
direction, and conscious awareness, which gives meaning to force.
Awareness connects power to the aim for which it is exercised
since power itself is simply a means and does not in itself have
any definite objective. Awareness, which transforms mere force
18. Ibid., p. 16.
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into power, presupposes some person who exercises it. So, I would
say that there is no such thing as power correctly understood that
does not have a personal subject who exercises it and is responsible
for it.
However, it is possible for power to be depersonalized when the
process of applying it is seen as “necessary,” independent of any
will. This depersonalization process can be put into effect first by
attributing to power a character of natural objectivity. In this case,
the role of conscience is eliminated and power becomes a simple
matter of force not subject to judgment any more than a thunderstorm or a change in the seasons. A second way consists of attributing to power a character of scientific objectivity. In this case,
scientific knowledge is seen as the perfect expression of human
intelligence to which individual intelligence and the community’s
politics must be adapted, thus eliminating any thought of evaluating—ethically and politically—the consequences and the applications of that knowledge. This elimination of conscience confers
technological omnipotence: it is good to do all that is in my power
to do. In both cases, eliminating the role of conscience rules out
all responsibility. Power is rendered impersonal, hence not responsible. By identifying power with nature or with knowledge, it is not
accountable for its own action.
There is a third way of depersonalizing power: by presupposing—without resorting to the appropriate instruments of verification—that the decision of power coincides with the general will of
those who constitute that power. This is what happens in a dictatorship. The dictatorial decision is the expression of an unlimited
power precisely because it presupposes agreement with the will
of those who ought to be evaluating that power. The dictator decides arbitrarily with no basis in authority. He or she is not held
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responsible, because the subject to whom he or she would have to
render account is eliminated.
Naturalistic and scientific ideology can also lead to dictatorships. For example, a dictatorship can be based on the naturalistic
idea of the “superman.” Here the claim is that nature has produced
more advanced individuals, authentic interpreters of the natural
universe, who are beyond the judgment of conscience understood
with Friedrich Nietzsche as the weaponry of the weak. In reality,
true weakness lies with the presumed superman, who wishes to
avoid the onus of responsibility. But responsibility is inescapable;
it is not something added on to human action if one wants it or
thinks it is particularly good. It comes along with the move into
action. Responsibility comes as a response to a demand, whether
from “a weak” being, as Paul Ricoeur would say, who needs help
with a newborn child, another person, or the state; or from an
inner demand, which, if acted on, would respond to another’s need
anyway. Assuming responsibility involves not only answering the
original demand that generated the responsibility itself, but also
answering the question from the one who asks an accounting for
what is done, such as the “weak one” who asked for aid. In other
words, it is not sufficient for someone to assume personal responsibility for oneself. By its very nature, responsibility always involves
a relationship in which there is a request for help and then for
an evaluation of what was done. Responsibility fully understood
brings together both the element of personal conviction that led one
to dedicate himself or herself to someone or something in the first
place and the evaluation of the consequences of one’s decision. Answering a request for help flows indeed from our own interiority.
But since it involves a social relationship, it has an interpersonal, or
public, dimension as well.
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The issue of responsibility is fundamental in order to avoid
errors in understanding the instrumental nature of power. True,
power acquires meaning from the aim that conscience assigns to it.
But such meaning (and morality) does not involve only the aim; it
must be expressed in the very exercise of power. The form assumed
by the means is not in fact indifferent to the aim. There are structures of power that are ethically unacceptable independently of the
aim that they claim to have, even when it is a good aim. Unacceptable in themselves are the exercising of power that do not accept
rules, limits, and controls insofar as they exclude the element of
any responsibility or accountability to others.
The impersonalization of power is expressed in the elimination
of any accountability, or any sense of responsibility or personal
relationship. Such impersonalization is a mystification. Power is
seen as an end in itself, without responsibility, without aim or direction. It is a void that becomes substance. Here is where the
demoniac is revealed, not as an abstraction but as the presence of a
“person-nonperson” who is manipulating the power: the demoniac
is impersonal, anonymous. The absence of nomos, law, constitutes
arbitrariness. In fact, the law is the order, established by a will, of
the one responsible, whether an individual or a collective. On the
contrary, arbitrariness is a constraint imposed anonymously, like
impersonal necessity. A community governed in this way appears
deprived of direction or aim, even if the appearances of infinite
freedom remain. But it is the infinity of the maze where one turns
this way and that but never escapes, an imitation of real infinity
much as the devil imitates God.
The postmodern shape of dictatorship resembles such a maze.
The dictatorships of the twentieth century are now modern with
an industrial fingerprint. They have developed a strong and visible
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power machine, and are not above using violence in imposing terror. Their functionaries are anonymous gears grinding humanity by
simply giving orders. The greatest atrocity is perpetrated “banally,”
Arendt would say, through the churning of the gears. On the other
hand, postmodern dictatorship is able to impose itself with no apparent show of violence, often with the enthusiastic support of the
crowds in which every individual thinks he or she is a champion of
infinite freedom. In the postmodern dictatorship, subjects are not
forced, but, as Plato would say, persuaded.
In this regard, it is interesting to observe how the demon remains typically impersonal in many facets of the idea of power
that begins to go along with modernity. Guardini comments:
Champions of modern progress . . . and the bourgeois, betray a fatal inclination: to exercise power in a more and more
fundamental, scientifically and technically perfect way, and
at the same time not to go on the defense openly, trying
instead to cloak power behind pretexts of usefulness, wellbeing, progress and so on. And so man has exercised power
without developing a corresponding ethic. This gives rise to a
use of force which is not essentially governed by ethics and is
more genuinely modeled in the anonymous society.19
It is characteristic of our modern age that the tendency to absolutize power goes hand in hand with the inability to think about it.
This may be caused by the fact that, like the ontological character
of man, power cannot be understood separately from its origin,
which is in God and in the “image and likeness” that God has
19. Ibid., pp. 31–32.
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impressed in the human person. Recognizing the origin would demand an honest look at the power’s tendency to keep increasing,
and, at the same time, at its natural limitation that disallows omnipotence. When the origin of power is rejected, there is a danger
that this absolutistic tendency will be accepted—which then becomes uncontrollable—and this fact will be concealed with inadequate and erroneous explanations. But dictatorships have taken it
upon themselves to point out the fact of the unrestrainable aspect
of power.
Acknowledging a connatural limit to power does not necessarily require faith in the Creator. It can also be based on right
reason, in the knowledge that every form of power is exercised on
some prior reality that deserves respect or on some present reality that does not allow free rein to my will. A good definition of
“reality” in a personalist sense of the reality of the other could be
“that which is not obtainable by force,” where the other could be
defined as “one who can say no to me.” The perennial temptation in our modern world has been to make power autonomous,
eliminating its relationship to the other, so that it is purely impersonal. This would eliminate, therefore, politics based on the Aristotelian model where the other is an “other me.” Without such
mutual recognition, there is no real citizenship and there is no real
politics.
This modern drift is fulfilled in the totalitarian phenomena of
the 1900s, characterized by a power that does not accept limitations to its own conduct. What is most worrying is that with the
collapse of visible totalitarianism, some of their fundamental elements are being regenerated in a new postmodern form. Let us
recall, with the help of Hannah Arendt, the specific elements of
traditional totalitarianism; then, in the final section of this article,
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we will try to understand the forms in which it is being regenerated in postmodern society and what can be done about it.
Totalitarianism is characterized, first of all, by a will for infinite
manipulation. This dynamic has to do with the refusal to recognize
reality; the denial of the facts related to the “existing situation,”
which also includes the will of those opposing the totalitarian
plans; the refusal to recognize the nature of the things; and the
idea of being able to modify or remake anything. In this present postmodern age, the creative omnipotence of totalitarianism
is no longer seen as a centralized and irresistible power. But it can
take other forms, as when individuals are also allowed to exercise
a certain power in some limited areas, where there is no danger
to political power, as a form of participation in power and as a reward for going along with it. Examples would be genetic manipulation, abortion, and euthanasia, that offer apparent “freedom” to
people and let the individual share the technological potential of
society, but make it unlikely that ethical questions will enter into
discussion.
This determination to avoid acknowledging reality also necessarily involves the inability to accept the limitations of one’s own
condition. This is a mistake, not from a desire to halt progress in
improving people’s lives, but because real progress must take the
limitations into consideration when it is ethically necessary to do
so. Denying that reality is a “given” that is not “produced” leads also
to rejecting the original “gift,” when awareness of it would instead
promote a sense of gratitude. A grateful person is disposed, in turn,
to give and to recognize that we have a common patrimony. One
assumes that the gift will be accepted because all progress is conducted with the hope that it may bring some benefit for all, and
therefore will take account of the interests of all those involved.

C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 1, No.1 (March 2012)

The only action that is fully human is that which begins by being
aware of and acknowledging the facts; knowing the boundaries is
the basis for success and for maintaining a tie to reality.
Even totalitarianism needs cultic forms to guarantee that there
is no acknowledgment of a God as an authority distinct from its
power that could limit its manipulation of reality. It prefers idolatry, in the form of uncritical adherence to the platitudes nurtured
by art, by the “forefathers,” by the approved teachers. At the same
time, absolute enemies must be created and so any contrary ideas
must be judged deplorable and the traditional religions must be
discredited, while official ideas are credited as consistent with nature or science. Finally, totalitarianism uses the lie systematically, not
only to discredit adversaries—if there are any left—but also to rewrite history, denying factual reality. At this point, when limitless
power is put to the test, we again face the issue of truth and its
relationship to politics.
Postmodern Society and the “Reconstruction” of Truth
Our current problem in the daily political debates in the democratic countries is that we are no longer able to determine who
is right and who is wrong. This leads certain politicians to take
opposite sides on the basis of the same principles; it allows some
to appeal to “sure” facts that others deny. This last point—the denial of factual truth and the impossibility for citizens to ascertain
it—sounds the political alarm. Denial of the facts has always been
typical of totalitarian regimes, that eliminate factual truth by suppressing witnesses, burning the books that deal with it, writing
new versions full of falsehoods, and subjecting teachers to strict
control. In the end, the lie prevails by direct and brutal elimination
of the truth.
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In our democratic systems, the process is different, but the result is the same. Thanks to Hannah Arendt and her analysis of
“factual truths,” the issue of truth has been reintroduced into the
political debate. According to Arendt, the denial of factual truth is
accomplished by the traditional system of rewriting history “under
the eyes of those who witnessed it. But it is equally true in ‘imagemaking’ of all sorts, that every known and established fact can be
denied or neglected if it is likely to hurt the image. For an image,
unlike an old-fashioned portrait, is supposed not to flatter reality
but to offer a full-fledged substitute for it.”20 The lie, as Arendt
explains, is a form of action in which the liar says “what is not,” in
order to change “that which is” to his or her own advantage. The
liar is even more credible when he or she succeeds in first convincing himself or herself of his or her own lie.
Self-deception thus becomes one of the fundamental mechanisms of denying factual truth: the liar adjusts to his or her own
public image and ends up depending on it. It must be continuously
refurbished through the mass media, that enormously enhances
the role and the power of those images. The politician, who is
taken up in this game, conditions the public on the one hand, and
on the other must also interpret its wishes in continuous interaction with the images produced by the others. At a certain point,
as we often see in televised debates, it is no longer the players who
govern the game. The game of images, into which the spectators
themselves enter by manifesting their approval through opinion
surveys, now commands the players. Someone will say that public
opinion should determine the positions of the politicians. But that
20. Hanna Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New
York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 247–48.

C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 1, No.1 (March 2012)

is already a serious matter because an authentic politician should
have a plan to execute independently of the changing opinions of
the moment.
It is even a more serious problem when people no longer see
any difference between fact and opinion now that factual truths are
transformed into opinions through the continuous manipulation
of images. In this way, the mass media becomes the instrument of
power, leading to a purely procedural conception of democracy.
The political winner is the one who succeeds in influencing the
greater number of opinions, whatever the facts may be. The final
result when totalitarianism eliminates factual truth is telecracy.
This is the end of politics because, as Arendt explains, factual truth
“is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses
and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is
spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature.”21 Eliminating it means eliminating politics. And
this means that politics, in order to survive, cannot avoid confronting itself with truth, that is, facing the reality of other persons.
Reality is such precisely because it is “other” in respect to the
one considering it. At the root of the denial of the truth by the
various political subjects, singly and collectively, is the denial of
the other, the determination to distinguish and distance oneself
from the other, going well beyond any real differences and adding
to the conflict. This is a formidable error, because it was exactly the
opposite when the state began with sharing one’s own sad experience with someone else, appreciating the other’s suffering, and
offering mutual help in a common difficulty. Think of the Italian
21. Ibid., pp. 233–34.
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Constituent Assembly, that was able to overcome ideological differences and synthesize relevant aspects of their own diverse political cultures on the basis of the unity reached in opposition to
Nazi fascism. At the origin of the state is the recognition by all of
a common experience, a factual truth, along with the principles of
reason. It is no surprise that the same search for truth in the West,
through the dialectic experience of the first philosophers, began
with accepting the other as a valid conversation partner.
At this point, however, the thought of Hannah Arendt no longer seems to face up to the whole problem we face today, namely,
the need to address not only diverse opinions unconnected to factual truths, but also diverse and conflicting philosophical truths
in the political arena. In fact, she ends up by returning to the old
philosophical vision of a clear separation between truth and politics. She argues for it by distinguishing philosophical truth from
factual truth: “Philosophical truth, when it enters the public arena,
changes its nature and becomes opinion, because a true and proper
metábasis eis állo génos takes place, a shift not just from one type
of reasoning to another, but from one mode of human existence
to another.”22 Whereas factual truths, as I have cited from Arendt,
are “connected to other people” and are “political by nature.” But,
one could object to Arendt: Does not the common recognition
of factual truth lead to the same problems that arise in the confrontation among the various truths of reason? Are not facts like
truths of reason subject to various interpretations, bearing different meanings depending on who observes and draws lessons from
them that differ from those drawn by others?
22. Ibid., p. 234.
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The difficulty in the relationship between truth and politics,
then, is not only that we move from truth to opinion, but from the
political thought of one to that of many. The problem of the passage from philosophical truth to opinion, before being presented
in the form so amply and precisely treated by Arendt, would probably have to be dealt with at its root. It could be expressed in this
way: Is philosophical truth, which Arendt considers the patrimony
of individuals, communicable to others? The philosophical truth of
the individual, according to Arendt, ceases being truth as soon as
it descends to the public arena, that is, as soon as it is seen as “one”
of many truths and becomes, therefore, opinion. Here, I would
respond by contesting Arendt’s major premise: that philosophical truth regards a person only in his or her singularity. On the
contrary, philosophical truth is by nature communitarian. There is
no opposition between the truth of the individual and that of the
others; rather, it comes about precisely as a unity of the many.
When Western civilization began and the problem of philosophical truth was raised in a conscious and explicit way so that
the search for it could begin, it was not understood as only an individual effort. On the contrary, one became a philosopher through
participation in the community. Plato explains that philosophy is
like a flame that is ignited in the soul of the individual only after a
long period of life in common and much discussion. The flame is
lit only after philosophers have lived together in a true and proper
school of life and thought. The very idea of truth arose as a common patrimony, and became incomprehensible the moment it was
considered merely a heritage of an individual. The first philosophical community, in fact, is a prototype of human community. The
trend is toward the universal.

58

Arendt speaks about metábasis as passage from the solitary philosopher to the public arena. But the first radical metábasis is that
of each philosopher when he or she leaves his or her own convictions behind in favor of the truth that is only reached collectively. It was Socrates who taught the method: it meant forgetting
yourself, putting yourself inside the other, taking the other’s point
of view, and then carrying on in the search for truth in total cooperation with the other. This is metábasis precisely in the sense of
acquiring a new location, a change of form. The philosopher leaves
the territory of his or her own soul—which is illuminated, secure,
and quite familiar—in order to venture into the space of another.
It is not by chance that Homer uses the word metáballo to indicate
Ulysses’ and his companions’ concealment in the belly of the horse,
the “other” place of darkness and testing that is nevertheless a necessary step for achieving victory.
If we in the West want to be coherent with the core of our
being and the civilization that has formed it, we would always have
to start with this presupposition: that the truth I bring must encounter the truth brought by the other, even when that other is
a political adversary. “My” truth and “his or her truth” have need
of one another. Either one without the other loses meaning. So, I
must have at heart not only the success of my party, aware of the
values that inspired it, but also the success of the other party, without confusing their different identities, but aware that they both
contribute to a “unity in the truth” that is deeper and stronger than
any division.
A political movement that seems necessary in Western democratic countries is a movement of politicians and citizens that reestablishes the conditions for unity in politics and sheds new light
on common foundations and a common goal. Only if the reality
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that unites the political society is clearly a truth common to all
can the various positions take on meaning. Then it is possible to
see the original contribution of each one. If that unity should decrease, then the identity of each political group becomes indistinct,
the debate becomes a sectarian scuffle, and politicians can well be
described by the words that the goddess directed to Parmenides
some 2,500 years ago at the beginning of the search for truth:
Mortals, knowing nothing, double-headed, go astray. For
helplessness in their breasts guides their errant minds. But
they are carried off equally deaf and blind, hordes without
judgment, for whom both to be and not to be are judged
the same and not the same; and the path of everything is
backward-turning.23
How can such a reality be reestablished today? First of all, we
could ask ourselves what has brought us together as a political
community and then decide to be, first of all, citizens who focus
on the principles and common values on which our political camaraderie is based. Our first allegiance, and the determining one that
confers unity on the political body, is the fact that there is a unity
that comes before all our differences. Differences are important
too, if straightforwardly understood. To do that, we must return to
the original ideals that formed us as a political group, to the roots
of our political culture, assessing the deep human need that led to
the birth of our party. We need to rediscover the authentic values
that it wanted to incarnate in history. We must preserve them as
a gift for the entire community, not for one party in conflict with
23. Poem of Parmenides, Fragment 6.5–6.9.
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others. Distinctiveness, we could say, is our second allegiance. It does
not give lie to the first, but achieves it because through it each of
us distinguishes our own task within the collectivity. It is by living
out our distinctiveness as a gift for the other that we build unity.
It is time we had the courage to undertake this radical revision,
which involves not only individuals, but also political groupings
and the entire community. We would do well to start even if we do
not know where the process will take us. It is not necessary to know
everything. Indeed, I would say that it is best not to know it and to
be aware that we do not possess the solution. This ignorance does
not limit our action. Not even Jesus in his abandonment knew, but
that did not prevent him from going ahead to the end. It allowed
him to express completely his fidelity to the truth. Not having the
solution leads us to search for it with others; it helps us avoid falling into an ideology that thinks we can impose our rationale on
everyone. The last thought of the authentic person will always be
for the other; his or her last word will be always: “Why?”
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